Introduction
We investigate whether the degree of international diversification affects firm value for U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs). Specifically, we determine whether the relative size of the foreign operation has a positive, negative, or no association with the difference between the actual observed firm value and an imputed value of the firm (called excess value). 1 Our analysis points to a statistically and economically significant positive excess value, or premium, to increased foreign operations. This is akin to finding that the value of the MNC is greater than the sum of its individual parts. We subject this finding to a battery of robustness tests to help determine whether it is simply an artifact of endogeneity or measurement error problems. We fail to find evidence that this is the case. The finding of a premium is robust across all specifications examined. In terms of magnitude, a one percent increase in the size of the foreign operation is associated with an increase of between 0.19% and 0.37% in excess value. Collectively, the evidence suggests that, on average, MNCs create value by organizing a set of otherwise independent activities within a multinational network.
A large literature examines whether firms that are industrially diversified trade at a discount or premium to non-diversified firms. This literature typically finds that industrially diversified firms trade at a discount. 2 A popular method to quantify this valuation effect was developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) , who compare the actual value of an industrially diversified firm with a hypothetical firm whose value is the sum of the imputed values of its individual industrial segments. As the individual segments of the diversified firm are not traded, the imputed value of each segment is the observable median firm value of a single-segment (non-diversified) firm operating in the same industry. The difference between the actual value and the imputed value is an estimate of the premium (if positive) or discount (if negative). Evidence of a negative association between this excess value measure and a measure of industrial diversification is consistent with industrial diversification destroying firm value, on average.
While the finding of an industrial diversification discount is quite robust, there is considerable debate about the interpretation. Some argue that the discount is evidence that the costs of operating in multiple industries outweigh the benefits (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995) .
Others argue that the discount is driven by the types of firms that choose to diversify or the types of businesses they invest in when diversifying (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004b) . The literature that uses this methodology continues to evolve, improving our understanding of the forces that drive the industrial diversification discount. For example, the recent study by Hoechle et al. (2012) finds that a substantial proportion of the discount can be explained by variation in corporate governance proxies.
In contrast to the literature on the industrial diversification discount, comparatively few studies examine how foreign operations affect firm value. 3 This contrast is surprising because descriptive data for U.S. firms indicates that industrial diversification has stagnated while foreign expansion continues at a rapid pace. We develop a method to quantify the value effects of foreign operations along the lines of Berger and Ofek (1995) but that remains applicable to the multinational setting. While Berger and Ofek (1995) divide each firm into industry segments, we divide each MNC into geographic-industry segments (i.e., separate country-industry components). 4 We then compare the actual value of the firm to the imputed value of the firm.
Using a method similar to Berger and Ofek (1995) , we determine the imputed value for each country-industry component by using the median single-segment firm operating exclusively in the same country and industry (i.e., single-segment foreign (domestic) firms in the same industry and country are used as benchmarks for the foreign (domestic) operations of U.S. MNCs). In other words, our approach uses data on the observed firm values of single-segment U.S. firms (from Compustat) and foreign firms (from Worldscope).
This approach to measuring excess value differs from previous methods to impute the firm value of MNCs. Denis et al (2002) use single-segment domestic firms (i.e., U.S. firms) in the same industry as a benchmark for both domestic and foreign MNC operations. Similarly, studies using Tobin's Q to investigate valuation effects of MNCs rely only on domestic benchmarks (e.g., Morck and Yeung, 1991; Morck and Yeung, 2001; Gande, Schenzler, and Senbet, 2009 ).
As growth rates and discount rates vary by country, we believe our method is more appropriate for measuring valuation effects in a multinational context. 5 This method, in effect, compares the value of the firm as a whole to the sum of the parts. In addition, our method is conceptually consistent with theories on foreign direct investment (FDI), which note that an MNC exists when a firm seeks to exploit its advantages and remove conflict arising in external market transactions by combining a firm of one nationality, that might otherwise exist independently, under the ownership of a firm of a different nationality (Dunning and Rugman, 1985) .
Our approach leverages data maintained by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which provides detailed accounting information about FDI, allowing measurement of sales for each 5 Denis et al. (2002) contemplate the use of single-segment foreign firms as a benchmark, noting three constraints to implementing such a procedure: (1) the country location of firms' foreign operations cannot be reliably identified using Compustat data, (2) the industry membership of firms' foreign operations cannot be identified reliably using Compustat data, and (3) valuation ratios may differ across countries due to differences in accounting standards. As described in our study, we overcome each of these constraints and find that the different benchmark is important and reverses prior findings.
country-industry in which U.S.-based MNCs operate. These data provide a substantial advantage over the Compustat database used by prior research. While Compustat provides some information about the countries and industries in which these firms operate, it is not as detailed about either of these dimensions (or their interaction) and heavily relies on managerial disclosure choices, which could induce measurement bias (Villalonga, 2004a) . In addition to the new method of estimating the value effects of foreign operations, we provide evidence that MNCs trade at a premium, which stands in contrast to the discount documented in Denis et al. (2002) .
This difference is primarily attributed to our use of foreign benchmarks to construct the imputed values of foreign operations.
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Our finding of a premium better reconciles with the findings in the international trade literature. By focusing on nonpublic establishment level (e.g., factory, store, or office) data, the trade literature is able to generate relatively precise proxies for total factor productivity (TFP) and provides robust evidence that firms engaging in international trade are more productive than those that do not (see Helpman, 2006 and Syverson, 2011 for reviews) . Furthermore, productivity differences tend to be highly persistent, even within narrowly defined industries (Syverson, 2011) . Due to data limitations, it is difficult to accurately measure TFP at the firm level, especially for firms which operate in multiple industries and/or countries. Nevertheless, Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) provide some evidence that U.S. firms engaging in FDI have labor productivity advantages over firms that do not. Reconciling the discount to multinational operations found by Denis et al. (2002) to the trade literature requires that the persistent productivity advantages of firms engaged in international trade must be more than offset by some other cost (e.g., agency costs). While this relation is possible, it is difficult to conjecture why the most productive firms would have the largest agency costs. In contrast, the finding of a premium easily reconciles with the trade literature.
Given our result, we investigate whether the premium is simply an artifact of innate characteristics of firms that choose to invest abroad. For example, Helpman et al. (2004) present a simple model with heterogeneous productivity endowments. The firms that receive the highest productivity endowments are the ones capable of paying the fixed costs to establish a foreign subsidiary. To the extent productivity advantages create excess value, one would expect the type of firms that choose to invest abroad would be valued at a premium, even in the absence of their foreign investments. After including firm fixed effects to control for time invariant firm characteristics (e.g., innate productivity advantages), we continue to find economically and statistically significant evidence of a premium to foreign operations.
To further account for the endogenous nature of FDI, we estimate a dynamic panel data model using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) , and Blundell and Bond (1998) . This estimator allows us to simultaneously account for the potential endogeneity of FDI, industrial diversification, and firm value. This method also yields a significant premium, which is of similar magnitude and significance to that estimated using fixed effects.
We also perform a series of additional robustness tests. First, we examine whether the measured excess value premium is driven by operations in countries with large control premiums (Dyck and Zingales, 2004) . In countries with large control premiums, using stock price in the calculation of total firm value could underestimate the true value of the benchmark firms and thereby induce an excess value premium. We fail to find evidence that the excess value premium is driven by such countries.
Second, we examine whether access to a low cost of capital is a meaningful source of the U.S. MNC advantage. We incorporate foreign benchmarks in our method of estimating firm excess value as it allows us to incorporate attributes of operating in those foreign countries -a key attribute being the cost of capital. Relative to the local benchmarks in foreign countries, U.S.
MNCs have the ability to obtain funds outside the local operating environments either by borrowing in the U.S. market or transferring capital internally. When competing against firms in shallow capital markets with high costs of capital, MNCs may have a competitive advantage over local foreign companies due to these alternative sources of capital. However, investors and lenders are likely to expect higher rates of return from the additional risk associated with operating in these environments, making it unclear whether a multinational network will enhance value in countries with a high cost of capital. In addition, foreign firms have some ability to access international capital markets, which mitigates the advantages to U.S. firms. To examine whether the cost of capital plays a role in our finding of a premium, we include a proxy for the extent of operations in countries with higher costs of capital. Our results are unaffected by the inclusion of the proxy.
Finally, we control for several corporate governance proxies, which Hoechle et al. (2012) find to be correlated with excess values (and industrial diversification). While magnitude of the premium is virtually unaffected by including these proxies, the significance level does decline due to the reduced sample size.
Our study contributes to the literature on multinational firms. Our new method of estimating excess values for multinational firms provides strong evidence of a statistically and economically significant premium associated with increased international operations. The premium is robust to a variety of specifications and controls designed to evaluate alternative explanations. In addition, this result easily reconciles with the international trade literature that establishes a link between greater productivity and international operations, though we do not find results supporting this as the only source of the premium. As segment disclosures improve and as new data sources become available on multinational activity (e.g., Bureau Van Dijk) our empirical approach can be used to investigate the extent to which the home country of the parent might influence the extent with which foreign operations affect firm value (i.e., by examining non-U.S. based MNCs). 7 Future studies could also examine the underlying forces affecting the excess value premiums across countries.
We also contribute to the understanding of international accounting standards and their comparability. Many studies seek to compare firms using different accounting standards. These comparisons generally rely on information generated by a particular accounting regime. By comparing commonly used metrics (total assets, net income, and sales) reported for the same firm and year across different regimes, we provide insights as to the relative comparability across standards. In particular, we find that sales is reported significantly more consistently across accounting regimes than the other metrics examined. This finding should aid researchers in reducing measurement error when comparing accounting information in multinational settings.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the motivation for finding a premium or discount to multinational operations. Section 3 describes our data and how the excess value of a firm is measured. A discussion of our independent variables and primary findings is presented in Section 4 with additional robustness tests provided in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
7 As MNCs are ultimately bound by the tax, regulatory, and legal frameworks of their home country, the valuation effect of foreign operations that we document for U.S.-based MNCs may be different in a sample of non-U.S. based MNCs with the same country-industry footprint. Theorists refer to these as 'locational advantages' enjoyed by all multinational firms of a given nationality and obtained irrespective of skills or capabilities unique to a particular firm (Yamin, 1991) . There is also evidence of locational advantages in the market for corporate control (Huizinga and Voget, 2009 ).
Premium versus discount
In a frictionless world where managers maximize firm value and markets are efficient, there should be no discount or premium to operating in foreign countries. and Majluf, 1984) . Consequently, diversified firms should be less liquidity constrained and better able to shift resources to the most valuable investment opportunities. Research has found that internal financing is used more often when diversified firms have operations in countries with more costly external financing (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004) . Multinational firms may also be relatively more protected than single-country firms when negative shocks hit external capital markets (Foley, Desai, and Forbes, 2008) . In a recent study, Matvos and Seru (2011) find that industrially diversified firms perform better than non-diversified firms when external capital markets are impaired.
While these arguments suggest that MNCs enjoy certain advantages when the foreign cost of capital is high, these benefits should be reduced by the additional risk associated with operating a business in a high cost of capital environment. For example, Verizon is a multinational firm operating in a number of countries. One of the higher cost of capital locations in which they operated was Venezuela. While the multinational structure of Verizon may have mitigated some of the risks associated with operating in a higher cost of capital location, the firms was unable to eliminate all of these risks. In fact, in 2007, Verizon's operations in that country were nationalized resulting in a net extraordinary loss of $131 million that year. 8 In other words, MNC investors are likely to expect higher rates of return to compensate for higher risk, which likely offsets some (if not all) of the potential excess value premium.
On the other hand, multinational firms may incur a discount (i.e., negative excess values)
relative to a similar footprint of stand-alone firms. Potential reasons for a discount largely rely on the existence of agency costs. Multinational firms tend to be larger, more complex, and less transparent. The combination of complexity and opacity inherent in MNCs reduces a firm's reliance on external capital as the cost of such capital increases due to agency costs (Desai et al., 2004) . As a result of the reduced reliance on external funds, MNCs face a reduced level of monitoring. As noted by Jensen (1986) , managers have incentives to increase firm size beyond that which is optimal with overinvestment or misallocation of funds to pet projects. If this lack of monitoring is in combination with available internal capital, empire building becomes easier (Hope and Thomas, 2008) . Furthermore, the current segment reporting standards under U.S.
GAAP only require highly aggregated disclosures of foreign operations and allow for considerable managerial discretion. As a result, operating in multiple countries makes it easier for management to hide poor performance -either their own or that of a division -such that low quality managers are more likely to be retained and overcompensated and poorly performing divisions retained longer than optimal. Other reasons one might expect a discount to be applied to multinational firms include higher coordination costs (e.g., coordinating across different cultures and languages) as well as additional risks. These risks include exposure to multiple political regimes, legal regimes, economic regulations, and currency fluctuations.
Past studies investigate whether foreign operations of U.S. firms enhance or reduce firm value. However, all of these studies benchmark the value of the foreign operations of an MNC to U.S. domestic firms. For instance, Denis et al. (2002) determine the implied value of a U.S.
MNC using domestic (U.S.) single-segment firms in the same industry as a benchmark. Studies using Tobin's Q to investigate valuation effects of MNCs also rely on domestic benchmarks (e.g., Morck and Yeung, 1991; Morck and Yeung, 2001; Gande, Schenzler, and Senbet, 2009 ).
However, using a U.S. domestic firm as a benchmark for the value of foreign operations implicitly makes two assumptions. First, this method assumes that the risks and expected growth rates of foreign operations are equivalent to those of domestic operations. This assumption is inconsistent with the findings of Hail and Leuz (2009) , which provides evidence that the cost of capital varies substantially across countries. Second, this method assumes that there is excess domestic capacity to allow for expansion with profitability similar to current domestic operations. We relax these assumptions by measuring the imputed value of a foreign component of a U.S. firm as if that component operated autonomously within that foreign country (rather than in the U.S.). Specifically, our multiples allow the cost of capital and expected growth rates to vary across not just industry but also country. Furthermore, our counterfactual does not require the assumption that operations be relocated, mitigating the production and sales capacity concerns.
Measuring excess value
3.1 Description of excess value Figure 1 shows the average percent of foreign sales (based on segment disclosures under U.S.
GAAP) across firms through time and illustrates that firms are continuing to expand internationally. 9 This expansion highlights the importance of understanding whether the decision to operate internationally is, on average, a value enhancing corporate strategy. We contribute to this understanding by evaluating whether the firm as a whole is worth more or less than its imputed value (i.e. the firm is valued in excess of the sum of its individual components).
We measure the excess value of a firm as the logarithm of the ratio of actual firm value to imputed value based on the method used in Berger and Ofek (1995) . The imputed value is the hypothetical value of the MNC under the assumption that its country-industry components operate as independent entities. A key innovation of our study is an alternative approach to imputing the value of the foreign operations of an MNC. Components of MNCs operating in a given industry and country are imputed using the value of single-segment firms operating in the same industry and country. Thus, we ensure the discount rates and expected growth rates are applicable to each given industry and location in estimating the implied values of the MNC segments.
The actual firm values are observable for all firms in our sample. The hypothetical firm values for multi-segment firms are imputed using market value to sales ratios, herein referred to as 'multiples', of the median single-segment firm operating in the same country-industry. (2003) for more detailed information on the BEA data. 11 Exhibit 21 disclosures of material subsidiaries and their locations in SEC 10-K filings could potentially help overcome the inability to observe the location of the firm's foreign operations from segment disclosures. However, at least three limitations remain: (1) for industrially diversified multinational firms, the researcher would be required to make an assumption about the proportion of industrial diversification in each country; (2) Exhibit 21 provides no information about the scale of activity in each jurisdiction; and (3) managerial discretion is used to determine a 'material' subsidiary under Section 601 of SEC Regulation S-K. 12 In fact, the expectation that a multinational firm would exhibit different industry membership in different countries is consistent with the theory of vertical foreign direct investment where firms separate their various value chain activities and locate them in the most favorable country (see, e.g. Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter, 2005) .
accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP). For each year, we observe the sales, industry composition, and location of not only the parent but also each affiliate.
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The procedures we use to construct our sample are similar to those used by Berger and Ofek (1995) and Denis et al. (2002) 
Measuring excess value
The dependent variable in our study is excess firm value (Excess Value), defined as the logarithm of the ratio of actual firm value to imputed firm value (Berger and Ofek, 1995) . 13 We obtain sales, industry membership, and country location for affiliates from one of two sources. When affiliates exceed the BEA-determined reporting thresholds (i.e., if their assets, sales, or net income ( Appendix A provides the definition of this and all other variables used in our analysis. We observe actual firm value, equal to a firm's market value of equity plus book value of liabilities (i.e., book value of total assets minus book value of total equity), using Compustat Fundamentals Annual data. We calculate imputed firm value as the sum of the imputed values of a firm's operations in each country-industry. Our method for imputing the value of the separate components of a firm can best be described in three steps. First, we obtain total sales generated by a firm for each country-industry in which it operates. 14 Second, we obtain multiples (market value to sales ratios) for benchmark firms operating in those same country-industries. Third, we multiply a firm's country-industry sales by the applicable median country-industry multiple to obtain the imputed market value for each country-industry operation. We perform each step annually.
Conceptually, imputed values can be based on assets (i.e., Tobin's Q), net income, or sales multiples. We restrict ourselves to sales multiples for two reasons. First, using value to sales ratios maintains consistency with the prior research on the excess value implications of multinational operations (e.g., Denis et al., 2002) . Second, as our method uses accounting data for foreign companies to compute country-industry multiples, the accounting numbers we use need to be consistently measured across firms using different accounting standards. We find that sales data are measured most consistently.
To assess the comparability of sales relative to either net income or assets across various accounting standards, we examine all firms listed on Worldscope as changing to or from U.S.
GAAP between 2005 and 2011. 15 We obtain accounting data for the year of the change and the prior year, where electronically available in English. We are able to obtain data for 66 firms changing standards, as detailed in Table 1 assess the comparability of these three summary accounting numbers across various accounting standards. Examining both the full sample as well as the subset that overlaps our study, we find that sales are more consistently measured than net income or assets.
The sum of the imputed values across the country-industry components of an MNC is an estimate of the value of a portfolio of unrelated businesses that mirror the related businesses of the firm. Consequently, a comparison of the actual firm value with the imputed firm value is a measure of how a multinational network affects firm value. We provide descriptive statistics for
Excess Value for our sample of 4,950 MNC firm-years in means and medians are < 0.01). 16 These results provide some initial evidence that operating in multiple countries is positively associated with firm value.
To estimate country-industry multiples, we rely on Worldscope financial data on foreign firms and Compustat Fundamentals Annual for domestic firms. We restrict the firms to include only those with at least 90% of sales, income, and assets inside the country of domicile (i.e., those that do not report significant multinational activity) and that operate in a single industry.
We refer to these firms as benchmark firms (either foreign or domestic depending on the country of domicile); these firms do not appear in any of our regressions. We report the number of benchmark firms during our sample period in Table 2 Panel A. The industry criterion is based on the two-digit SIC code. 17 For every country that has at least five firms in the respective industry and year, we use the median ratio of market value to sales. 18 This ratio is the country-industry multiple -an input required to compute imputed values.
To determine the country-industry composition of MNCs we rely on BEA data. In Table 3 we report the aggregate number of foreign affiliates and total sales, by country, as provided by the BEA data for our sample of 4,950 MNCs. The specific countries tabulated are those that represent at least 0.2 percent of total firm sales (pooled across all years) in our sample. The top five foreign countries in which MNCs generate sales are Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan. 
Empirical results

Independent variables
Recall that our objective is to examine the overall relation between excess firm value and multinational operations. Our proxy for the extent of multinational operations is the percentage of total firm sales made by foreign operations (%Foreign Sales). By this measure, the extent of multinational activity in our sample of MNCs is non-trivial - Table 2 Panel B shows that approximately 24 percent of sales are generated by foreign operations, on average. Our first analysis estimates ordinary least square regressions of Excess Value on %Foreign Sales and control variables (discussed below).
We include variables in our regression to control for other potential determinants of excess value. These are the percentage of sales made by the firm outside its primary industry (%Industry Other) to control for any relation between industrial diversification and excess value as in Berger and Ofek (1995) . For this purpose, we obtain industry sales using Compustat Segment data. 19 A firm's primary industry is the industry in which the firm generates the majority of its sales, and we determine industry sales at the business segment level. We set %Industry Other equal to zero for firms that operate in a single business segment.
Consistent with prior research, we also include controls for firm size (Log Size), the ratio of long term debt to total market value (Debt / Firm Value), the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales (CAPX / Sales), the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total sales (EBIT / Sales), the ratio of research and development expenses to total sales (R&D / Sales), and the ratio of advertising expenses to total sales (Ad / Sales). Table 2 Panel B provides the distribution of the control variables. All independent variables are Winsorized at 1%. In our OLS regressions, we use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent robust standard errors with clustering at the firm level.
Primary regression analysis
In this section, we examine the relation between firm excess value and the amount of foreign activity at U.S. MNCs. Table 4 contains the results of regressions of excess value on %Foreign Sales for multiple specifications. In column (1), Excess Value is regressed on both the percent of foreign sales (%Foreign Sales) and the percent of sales outside the firm's primary industry (%Industry Other). We add the control variables to the regression in column (2) and year indicators in column (3). In all three specifications the coefficient on the percent of foreign sales remains significantly positive (with a p-value < 0.01). For a sense of economic magnitude, in column (3), a one standard deviation (19.7%) increase in the percent of foreign sales (%Foreign Sales) is associated with a 4.1% (equal to (e 0.349 -1) × 0.197) increase in firm excess value. The effect is larger for the other two columns -8.2% increase in firm excess value in column (1) and 4.6% in column (2).
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Our finding of a premium reconciles with the international trade literature, which finds that firms engaging in international trade are more productive than those that do not (see Helpman, 2006, and Syverson, 2011 , for reviews). Due to data limitations, it is difficult to accurately measure TFP at the firm level, especially for firms which operate in multiple industries and/or 20 Using the alternative strategy that employs U.S. domiciled single-segment firms as the benchmark for the imputed value of the foreign operations, Denis et al. (2002) find that greater foreign activity results in a discount to firm value. Using the Denis et al. (2002) method to calculate excess value in our sample, we obtain a significantly negative regression coefficient on %Foreign Sales using the models in Table 4 , columns (2) and (3) (the coefficient is not significant using the model in column (1), results untabulated).
countries. As an alternative method to evaluate whether our finding of a premium is simply the result of more productive firms also having more multinational operations, we investigate whether the premium is simply an artifact of innate characteristics of firms that choose to invest abroad. For example, Helpman et al. (2004) present a simple model with heterogeneous productivity endowments. The firms that receive the highest productivity endowments are the ones capable of paying the fixed costs to establish a foreign subsidiary.
To the extent that productivity advantages create excess value, one would expect the type of firms that choose to invest more abroad would be valued at a premium, even in the absence of their foreign investments. To control for time invariant firm characteristics (e.g. innate productivity advantages) and hence a potential source of endogeneity, we add firm-level fixed effects in column (4) of Table 4 . We continue to find that the extent of foreign operations (%Foreign Sales) is positively associated with Excess Value. Across all specifications, the sign on all significant control variables is consistent with prior research (e.g., Ofek, 1995 and Denis et al., 2002) .
The finding of a premium makes a significant contribution to the relatively sparse literature on the value effects of multinational activity. Our measure of imputed value expands upon the methods used by Berger and Ofek (1995) and Denis et al. (2002) but allows us to answer a different question than Denis et al. (2002) . Holding constant the extent of industrial diversification, we ask whether MNCs are more valuable than a portfolio of benchmark firms of a similar geographic footprint. In contrast, Denis et al. (2002) ask whether, holding constant the extent of industrial diversification, MNCs are more valuable than a portfolio of domestic (U.S.) benchmark firms. We believe that asking whether an MNC's foreign (domestic) operations are more valuable than those of a foreign (domestic) firm is a more appropriate way to assess the value implications of a multinational network.
Robustness
Endogeneity related to dynamic relations
Prior research argues that the relation between industrial diversification and excess firm value could be endogenous through dynamic relationships based on observing past outcomes.
Managers of firms likely choose to enter or exit industries or geographic regions based upon their previous performance. For example, Campa and Kedia (2002) find that firms are more likely to enter new industries when prospects in their current lines of business are deteriorating.
Similar dynamics could also drive a relation between excess value and FDI. We assess the robustness of the previous results by estimating a dynamic panel data model, which allows us to control for dynamic endogeneity in addition to firm level unobserved heterogeneity. We employ the GMM estimator for dynamic panel models developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) , and Blundell and Bond (1998) . Our results from this analysis confirm our previous findings that firms with a larger degree of foreign operations have positive excess values.
Dynamic panel data models are generalizations of the traditional fixed effects model where lags of the dependent variable are added to the right hand side of the equation. These additional lags control for the impact a firm's past performance has on its current performance through the channels discussed above. The GMM estimator for dynamic panel models developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) starts by differencing the data at the firm level in neighboring time periods to eliminate any firm specific, time invariant unobserved heterogeneity that may be present. Eliminating the firm specific fixed effect by differencing the data with lags of the dependent variable on the right hand side introduces correlation between the new error term and the differenced explanatory variables. This problem is solved by applying the standard GMM estimator using lags of both the original explanatory variables and excess value as instruments.
We note that the dynamic panel data framework allows us to treat both international and industrial diversification (as well as the other firm-specific control variables) as endogenous. (2012), we add two years of lags of a firm's excess value to the right hand side, assuming that this is enough lags to control for dynamic feedback effects. We then use past values of all variables beyond the second lag up to a total of seven years to act as instruments.
The results of the dynamic panel data estimator are reported in Table 5 . These results confirm the previous finding of a positive relation between the degree of international operations and excess value. We note that the size and significance level of the coefficient on %Foreign Sales diversification are robust to changes in the number of lags used as instruments. The Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator includes testing diagnostics for correct specification of the model. If the model is correctly specified, differences in the residuals from the levels equation should be serially uncorrelated at lag one but correlated at lag two. The p-values for tests of serial correlation of the residuals at lags 1 and 2 are reported in Table 5 and these indicate that the model is not rejected. We also report in Table 5 the Hansen test for overidentification, which is a test of the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The p-value for this test is 0.30
indicating that we fail to reject this null hypothesis. Finally, we report another test for exogeneity known as the difference-in-Hansen test, which tests the null hypothesis that the instruments in the original equation are valid. We fail to reject this null hypothesis as well.
Identifying value effects of multinational operations via cross-border acquisitions
Another alternative to investigating a causal link between foreign direct investment and firm value is an event study of foreign acquisitions. 21 Acquired foreign targets represent only a small fraction of MNCs' worldwide sales in the year of the acquisition -less than 1 percent in our sample. Additionally, cross-border acquisitions are not the primary source of international expansion for the average firm. We find that foreign acquisitions account for between 1.8 percent and 5.5 percent of the year-over-year change in foreign sales, with the remainder of the growth coming from either newly established entities (i.e., greenfield investments) or growth in existing operations. 22 These results suggest that acquisitions are not a material source of growth for the 21 Doukas and Travlos (1988) find positive returns when the acquirer is not operating in the target firm's country and insignificant returns when the acquirer is operating in the target firm's country or expanding internationally for the first time. Morck and Yeung (1991) find marginal evidence of positive returns for firms with intangible assets. Finally, Doukas (1995) finds positive returns only for firms with average Tobin's q ratios greater than one. More recent work also using an event study methodology provides mixed evidence on valuation effects of global diversification through acquisitions. Dos Santos, Errunza, and Miller (2008) find insignificant returns for firms with already established foreign operations, firms establishing initial foreign operations, and firms acquiring targets in related industries. Doukas and Kan (2006) and Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) find reductions to shareholder value, while Francis, Hasan, and Sun (2008) find positive returns for acquirers of targets in segmented financial markets. 22 New foreign affiliates to an MNC group each year report on the BEA survey whether they entered the group as an acquisition or a newly established entity (i.e., greenfield investment). Affiliates under the lowest reporting threshold do not report this information, resulting in our inability to precisely identify the source of 3.3 percent of the increase in firm sales as either acquisition or greenfield.
typical U.S. MNC, suggesting that an event study would lack power and generalizability. For these reasons, we do not implement an event study.
Control premium
A control premium, or private benefits of control, occurs when "some value, whatever the source, is not shared among all the shareholders in proportion of the shares owned, but it is enjoyed exclusively by the party in control" (Dyck and Zingales, 2004, p. 541) . Using stock prices of traded shares held by minority shareholders in determining the market value to sales ratios of our benchmark firms could underestimate the true value of our benchmark firms if those firms face large control premiums. This, in turn, could induce an excess value premium because the imputed value of these country-industry segments would be artificially low. The existence of such benefits is more prevalent in some countries than others and could affect the value of an MNC's operations in such domains. We use the country-level control premiums from Dyck and Zingales (2004) and, using each firm's country sales as a percent of total firm sales, we obtain a weighted average control premium that each MNC faces (Control Premium). For countries not included in the Dyck and Zingales (2004) analysis we set the control premium equal to zero. 23 In Table 6 we show that %Foreign Sales remains positive and highly significant (p-value < 0.01) when we include the proxy for control premium. As a result, it does not appear that the excess value premium is driven by MNCs operating in countries where majority shareholders are able to extract large control premiums.
Cost of capital
As discussed in Section 2, when countries have shallow capital markets, a multinational network may provide the benefit of a lower cost of capital for investments through an internal capital market as well as through better access to the U.S. capital market. Prior research establishes that there is substantial variation in the cost of capital across countries (Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta, 1996, and Hail and Leuz, 2009) . To determine whether the documented premium is due to cost of capital advantages we include a control variable to capture the difference between the MNC's cost of capital and the cost of capital faced by its competitors in the global markets in which it operates.
We compute our Cost of Capital proxy in two steps. First, we obtain the country-year credit rating published by Institutional Investor. 24 The rating ranges from 0 to 100 where higher values imply that a country has a higher default risk. Country-level credit risk is a reasonable predictor of expected equity market returns and volatility (Erb et al., 1996) and exhibits a highly significant correlation with international accounting-based estimates of imputed cost of capital (Hail and Leuz, 2009 ). Second, using each firm's country sales as a percent of total firm sales, we obtain a weighted average credit risk rating across the countries in which each firm operates.
A higher value implies an MNC operates in countries with higher cost of capital. In Table 7 , we do not find a result consistent with MNCs gaining an advantage from their access to low cost capital-Cost of Capital is not significantly associated with Excess Value.
25 24 We thank Cam Harvey for providing these data. 25 Results are consistent using cost of capital as defined in Erb et al., 1996. 
Corporate governance
In light of the recent finding that corporate governance mitigates the diversification discount, we examine whether the premium to multinational activity is sensitive to controls for corporate governance. Hoechle et al. (2012) find that the magnitude of the industrial diversification discount is decreased and, in several specifications, no longer significant in the presence of governance proxies. In the first column of Table 8 (2003) (Governance Index).
As documented in Table 8 , including these control variables reduces our sample size by almost 50% (to 2,550 observations) and tends to exclude the smaller firms from the analysis.
None of the governance proxies are significant. Relative to column (4) of Table 4 , the coefficient on %Foreign Sales is similar in magnitude but is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. To investigate whether the decreased significance is due to the smaller sample or the inclusion of the governance variables, we re-estimate the regression for the same 2,550 observations after removing the governance controls. The coefficient and t-statistic are virtually identical, suggesting that the loss of significance is due to the reduced sample and not the governance controls. We do not find evidence to suggest that variation in corporate governance practices drives variation in excess value for U.S. MNCs.
Conclusion
Using a new method to quantify the valuation effects of foreign direct investment by U.S.
domiciled firms, we find robust evidence of a premium in excess value associated with the degree of multinational operations. Our method builds on that used in previous studies examining firm excess value (e.g., Ofek, 1995, and Denis et al., 2002) by incorporating the location, in addition to the industry, of each corporate affiliate. This allows important factors such as growth and cost of capital to vary across countries as well as industries.
Examining a sample of multinational firms, we find that a one-standard deviation (19.7%) increase in foreign operations is associated with an increase of between 4.1% and 8.2% in excess value − both a statistically and economically significant finding.
This result complements the finding of the international trade literature that more productive firms are more likely to operate internationally. However, the premium remains after including firm fixed effects to control for persistent firm traits (e.g., productivity).
The finding of a premium stands up to a succession of robustness tests designed to evaluate whether the result arises from alternative methods or explanations. First, we estimate a dynamic panel data model using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to simultaneously account for the potential endogeneity of FDI, industrial diversification, and firm value. Second, we include a control variable to proxy for whether the firm operates in countries with larger control premiums, which could result in understated multiples and mechanically induce a premium. Third, we include a control variable to measure the cost of capital across the countries in which an MNC operates to evaluate whether a relatively low cost of capital borne by multinational firms is a meaningful source of the premium. Fourth, we control for several corporate governance proxies, which have been found to be correlated with excess values (and industrial diversification). We fail to find evidence supporting any of these alternative explanations -the premium in excess value arising at firms with greater multinational operations remains significant.
Overall, our new method of estimating excess values for multinational firms provides strong evidence of a statistically and economically significant premium associated with increased international operations. The premium is robust to a host of specifications and controls designed to evaluate alternative explanations. We leave to future research the questions of whether the premium to U.S. multinational firms applies more broadly to other countries of domicile and what factors influence the premium.
CEO Ownership = Percent of shares owned by the CEO, from Execucomp.
Institution Ownership = Percent of shares owned by institutional investors, from Thomson Reuter's Institutional Holdings database.
Powerful CEO = Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is the only insider on the board of directors and also serves as the chairman and president based on data from RiskMetrics Directors database. Equal to zero otherwise.
Governance Index = Count measure of takeover defenses used in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , from RiskMetrics Governance database. As the governance data are not available for every year, we follow Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and assume that the firms' governance attributes are unchanged until publication of the subsequent series. This table reports the result from a regression of the excess value on the percent of foreign sales (%Foreign Sales), the percent of non-primary industry sales (%Industry Other), and control variables using a dynamic panel GMM estimator. All control variables are considered to be endogenous with the exception of the year indicator variables. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals with the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test of overidentification is that all instruments are valid. The null hypothesis of the difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is that the instruments used for the equation in levels are exogenous. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics and significance levels are computed using clustered standard errors with firm level clustering. Significance levels are indicated by ***, **, and * representing 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (2-tailed).
Dep. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) governance index (Governance Index). In the second column, the regression includes the same sample and variables with the exception of the governance proxies, which are excluded. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Tstatistics and significance levels are computed using clustered standard errors with firm level clustering. Significance levels are indicated by ***, **, and * representing 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (2-tailed). 
